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Abstract
The paper studies matching markets where institutions are matched
with possibly more than one individual. The matching market con-
tains some couples who view the pair of jobs as complements. We
specify that the couples have a “weak” preference to be matched to-
gether. We first assume that the institutions have common preference
over all the individuals. We then characterize under which weak pref-
erences of couples a stable matching exist. We then impose further
conditions on the common preference of institutions over the individ-
uals and prove existence of stable matching for unrestricted couple
preferences. Finally, we establish a result on stability by relaxing the
condition on common preference of institutions over individuals and
assuming different preferences for different institutions.
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1 Introduction
In many different contexts, there is a centralized matching procedure by
which individuals on one side of the market are matched with institutions
on the other side of the market. These include the market for lawyers in
Canada, children in schools in the USA, doctors and senior-level health-care
professionals in several countries, etc. There is a huge literature which has
been developed on various market designs to find out an “optimal” matching
procedure to produce stable matchings. A matching is stable when there
does not exist any institution-individual pairs which can block the original
matching by getting matched together, such that both of them are better off
compared to their original matching. It was shown by Roth (1984) [9] that
it is possible to have mechanisms which induced only one side of the market
to correctly reveal their preferences. However, the results on stability have
been more encouraging as the received doctrine is that stable matchings do
exist under appropriate domain restrictions. But to achieve that, institutions
must view individuals as substitutes and individuals also must only care
about the institution to which they are matched. It was first pointed out
by Roth (1984) [8] that the presence of couples in the labour market may
lead to an impossibility result where no stable matching may exist. This can
happen because couples may view pairs of jobs as complements. Thus, the
assumptions which consider the choices of individuals to be independent of
each other might not apply. Klaus and Klijn (2005) [5] identify the maximal
domain of preferences of couples under which stable matchings exist. The
maximal domain satisfies responsiveness, meaning that a couple is better off
when any member of the couple is matched with a more preferred institution.
However, Kojima, Pathak, and Roth (2010) [6] point out that Responsiveness
is not satisfied in their data sets because couples show strong preference to
be matched in institutions situated in the same geographical area.
In this paper, we consider a set of doctors including some couples. We fo-
cus on the issue of existence of stable matchings with couples. Furthermore,
we first look at the scenario when all the institutions have common prefer-
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ences over singleton doctors. This can be easily justified if hospitals rank
doctors according to grades of some common examination. The institutions
have a linear order over the set of doctors. However, the preference over the
set of doctors might vary from one institution to the other even when the
preference on singleton doctors remains the same. The starting point of our
analysis is how to model the common preferences of the institutions and how
to model the preference ordering of any couple over pairs of positions, given
the individual preferences of each member of the couple. We look into a
setting where the set of institutions is a finite set and there is no information
about the “distance” between any pair of institutions. But when a couple
is matched with the same institution, then the distance trivially becomes
zero. Thus as assumed by Dutta and Massó (1997) [3], we have an option to
assume that a couple prefers to be matched at the same institution rather
than being matched with different institutions.
We assume that the preferences of institutions satisfy responsiveness, i.e.,
for two allocations of an institution, which differ in exactly one doctor, the
institution prefers the allocation with the better doctor. We then analyse the
situation where couples’ preferences violate responsiveness as long as they
can be together in any possible institution. We show that under common
preferences of institutions we will have stable matchings if, and only if, the
couples’ preferences do not violate responsiveness with respect to the more
preferred institution of the couple.
We then restrict the condition of common institution preferences such
that the couples are ordered consecutively. We finally show that under lexi-
cographic preferences of institutions, stable matchings exist for unrestricted
couples’ preferences if, and only if, the couples are ordered consecutively
under the common institutions preference over individuals.
Finally, we find out the consequences of relaxing the condition of common
preferences of the institutions over individuals. We establish a result for
the existence of stable matchings when institutions’ do not have common
preference over individuals. It turns out that the results proved earlier are
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not sufficient to prove the existence of stable matchings in this scenario. Thus
we need to impose further restrictions on couples’ preferences in order to get
a stable matching.
In section 2, we formally introduce the model, providing all the necessary
definitions, notations and algorithms which are used throughout this paper.
In section 3, we give a necessary and sufficient condition on couples’ pref-
erences which always guarantees a stable matching when institutions have
common preference over individual doctors. In section 4, we further restrict
the common preference over individuals, and look for the conditions which
guarantee stable matchings for unrestricted couples’ preferences. Finally, in
section 5, we consider the case where institutions may not have common
preference over individual doctors and give conditions for stable matchings.
2 The Framework
We consider many-to-one matching between doctors and hospitals. We de-
note by H the set of hospitals. We use the notation H¯ to denote H ∪ {∅}.
The interpretation of ∅ is that if some doctor is matched with ∅, then that
doctor is unmatched. Each hospital h ∈ H has a finite capacity κh ≥ 1. We
denote by D the set of doctors. F,M, S is a collection of pairwise disjoint
subsets of D such that |M | = |F |. Here, S is the set of single doctors which
are not a part of any couple and F andM together form couples. We further
denote the set of couples by C = {{f1,m1}, . . . , {fk,mk}}. We denote a cou-
ple by c = {f,m}. Throughout this paper, we assume |H| ≥ 2, |D| ≥ 4 and
|C| ≥ 1. We also assume that the total number of vacancies in all hospitals
in H is equal to the total number of doctors available, i.e.,
∑
h∈H κh = |D|.
Consider a couple c = {f,m}. Then, an allocation of the couple c is an
element (h, h′) of H¯2 where hospital h is matched with doctor f and hospital
h′ is matched with doctor m.
For notational convenience, we do not use braces for singleton sets.
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2.1 Matching
Definition 1 A matching is a mapping µ : H ∪D → H¯ ∪ 2D such that
(i) for all h ∈ H, µ(h) ⊆ D with |µ(h)| ≤ κh,
(ii) for all d ∈ D, µ(d) ∈ H¯, and
(iii) for all d ∈ D and h ∈ H, µ(d) = h if and only if d ∈ µ(h).
The first condition of the definition says that every hospital h ∈ H can
be matched with at most κh many doctors. The second condition says that
every doctor can be either matched with exactly one hospital in H or be
unmatched. The third condition captures the basic idea of matching that if
a doctor is matched with a hospital, then that hospital is also matched with
that doctor.
2.2 Preferences
In this section, we introduce the notion of preferences of doctors and hospi-
tals, and present the restrictions on them.
For a set X, we denote by L(X) the set of linear orders, i.e., complete,
reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relations over X. An element
of L(X) is called a preference over X. For P ∈ L(X) and k ≤ |X|, we define
the rank rk(P ) = x if and only if |{y ∈ X : yPx}| = k. This means that the
rank of x in P is k if and only if there are k−1 alternatives y1, . . . , yk−1 such
that yi 6= x and yiPx for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
2.2.1 Preferences of Hospitals
A preference of a hospital h ∈ H, denoted by Ph, is a linear order over
the feasible sets of doctors {D′ ⊆ D : |D′| ≤ κh}, i.e., Ph is an element of
L({D′ ⊆ D : |D′| ≤ κh}). We assume hospitals’ preferences to be responsive
which we define below.
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Definition 2 A preference Ph of a hospital h ∈ H with capacity κh satisfies
Responsiveness if for any D′ ⊆ D with |D′| ≤ κh the following hold:
(i) for any d′ ∈ D′ and any d ∈ D \D′, ((D′ ∪ d) \ d′)PhD′ if and only if
dPhd
′, and
(ii) for any D′′ ( D′, D′PhD′′.
Here the first condition says that there are no complementaries across
doctors, and the second condition says that all the doctors are acceptable
for hospital h. Throughout this paper, we assume that hospitals’ preferences
satisfy responsiveness.
In the following, we define the notion of common preference over individ-
ual doctors. We call this preference - Common Preference over Individuals
(CPI)
Definition 3 A collection of preferences (Ph)h∈H of hospitals in H is com-
mon over individual doctors if for all pairs of hospitals h, h′ ∈ H and for all
d, d′ ∈ D, dPhd′ if and only if dPh′d′.
Note that, CPI implies that all the hospitals have common preference
over individual doctors. However, it does not impose any restriction on the
preferences of the hospitals over larger subsets of doctors.
Unless mentioned otherwise, we CPI at every collection of preferences of
the hospital. Under CPI, the common restriction of (Ph)h∈H over individual
doctors is defined as P 0 ∈ L(D) such that for all d, d′ ∈ D, dP 0d′ if dPhd′ for
all h ∈ H. Throughout this paper, we use P 0 to denote CPI. Whenever we
consider a CPI P 0, we assume for ease of presentation that the indexation of
the doctors in couples is such that fP 0m for every couple c = {f,m} ∈ C,
and miP 0mj for all i < j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. This is without of loss of generality
as we consider only one CPI at every given context.
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2.2.2 Preferences of Doctors
A preference of a doctor d ∈ D, denoted by Pd, is a linear order over H¯, i.e.,
Pd is an element of L(H¯). We assume hPd∅ for all h ∈ H and all d ∈ D.
Having defined the preferences of the doctors (as singles), now we proceed
to define the preferences of the couples.
Preferences of Couples
A preference of a couple c = {f,m} ∈ C, denoted by Pc, is a linear order
over H¯2, i.e., Pc is an element of L(H¯2).
In this paper, we intend to deviate from responsiveness in a ‘minimal’ way
and study its consequences on stability. We assume that a preference of a
couple is almost responsive except in the situations where both the members
of the couple get to stay together in some hospital. The usual definition of
responsive couple preference means that for two allocations of a couple that
differ in the allocation for only one couple member, the couple prefers the
allocation where that member is assigned to his/her more preferred hospi-
tal. However, here we allow for a couple to violate responsiveness only if
the couple gets allocated to the same hospital. We call this ‘preference for
togetherness’.
In the following, we define responsiveness for couples’ preferences. The
notion of responsiveness is in principle the same as that for a preference of
a hospital. However, for the sake of clarity, we present the formal definition
below.
Definition 4 Let c = {f,m} ∈ C be any couple. Let Pf be a preference of
f and Pm be a preference of m. Then, a preference Pc ∈ L(H¯2) of the couple
c satisfies Responsiveness if the following holds. For all h, h1, h2 ∈ H¯, we
have
(i) (h, h1)Pc(h, h2) if and only if h1Pmh2, and
(ii) (h1, h)Pc(h2, h) if and only if h1Pfh2
For a couple c, by DRc we denote the set of responsive preferences of c.
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Definition 5 Let c = {f,m} be any couple. Then, a preference ordering
P¯c ∈ L(H¯2) of the couple c satisfies Responsiveness Violated for Togetherness
(RVT) if there is a responsive preference Pc ∈ DRc of the couple c such that
(i) for all h ∈ H and all (h1, h2) ∈ H¯2, (h, h)Pc(h1, h2) implies (h, h)P¯c(h1, h2),
and
(ii) for all (h, h′), (h1, h2) ∈ H¯2 such that h 6= h′ and h1 6= h2, (h, h′)Pc(h1, h2)
if and only if (h, h′)P¯c(h1, h2).
For a couple c, by DRV Tc we denote the set of RVT preferences of c.
Note that, RVT implies that couples’ preferences can violate responsive-
ness only in order to be together in some hospital. Further note that, by
taking h1 = h2 in Condition (i) of Definition 5, it follows that the relative or-
dering among the allocations where both the doctors of a couple c are in the
same hospital does not change from Pc to P¯c. Thus, P¯c is obtained from Pc
by shifting hospital pairs (h, h) to higher preference positions (lower ranks).
Remark 1 In the rest of the paper, we assume that for all hospitals h ∈ H,
we have κh ≥ 2.
2.2.3 Preference Profiles
In this section, we define the notion of a preference profile.
Definition 6 A preference profile P˜ for hospitals in H and doctors in D
with couples C is defined as a collection of preferences ({P˜d}d∈D, {P˜ c}c∈C , {P˜h}h∈H)
where for all d ∈ D, P˜d is a preference of doctor d, for all c ∈ C, P˜ c is a
preference of couple c, and for all h ∈ H, P˜h is a preference of hospital h.
By a matching problem, we mean the set of hospitals with corresponding
capacities, the set of doctors with its partition into the set of F and M , and
a preference profile.
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2.3 Stability
Our model is formally equivalent to a many-to-many matching market as
a couple looks for two positions and hospitals have at least two positions.
Thus, one can have different notions of stability based on different types of
permissible blocking coalitions.1
Blocking pairs can be a hospital and a single doctor, or a pair of hospitals
and a couple.
Definition 7 Let s ∈ S be a single doctor and h ∈ H be a hospital. Then,
for two matchings µ, µ′, we write µ→{h,s} µ′ if
(i) µ′(h) = (µ(h) \D′) ∪ s for some (possibly empty) D′ ⊆ µ(h), and
(ii) µ′(h′) = µ(h′) \ s for all h′ 6= h.
The statement µ→{h,s} µ′ captures the idea that the hospital h and the
single doctor s can change their allocations under µ to that under µ′ because
h can release some doctors and hire s. Moreover, hospitals other than h
continue to retain their allocations unless they were matched with s.
Definition 8 Let c = {f,m} ∈ C be a couple. Let (h1, h2) ∈ H2. Then,
for two matchings µ, µ′, we write µ→{(h1,h2),c} µ′ if
(i) µ′(h1) = (µ(h1) \D′) ∪ f , for some (possibly empty) D′ ⊆ µ(h1),
(ii) µ′(h2) = (µ(h2) \D′′)∪m, for some (possibly empty) D′′ ⊆ µ(h2), and
(ii) µ′(h) = µ(h) \ {f,m} for all h ∈ H \ {h1, h2}.
The statement µ→{(h1,h2),c} µ′ captures the idea that the pair of hospitals
{h1, h2} and the couples c can change their allocations under µ to that under
µ′ because each of the hospitals can release some doctors and hire one or
1See Roth (1984) [8], Roth (1984) [9], Konishi and Ünver (2006) [7], Echenique and
Oviedo (2006) [4] for some alternative notions of stability in many-to-many matchings.
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both doctors of the couple. Moreover, hospitals other than the hospitals in
{h1, h2} continue to retain their allocations unless they were matched with
any member of the couple c.
In the following, we introduce the notion of a blocking.
Definition 9 Let h ∈ H be a hospital and s ∈ S be a single doctor. Then,
(h, s) blocks µ through µ′ if µ→{h,s} µ′, µ′(h)Phµ(h), and hPsµ(s).
Definition 10 Let c = {f,m} be a couple. Let (h1, h2) ∈ H2. Then,
((h1, h2), c) blocks µ through µ′ if µ→{(h1,h2),c} µ′, µ′(c)Pcµ(c) and µ′(h)Phµ(h)
for all h ∈ {h1, h2} such that µ′(h) 6⊆ µ(h).
Thus, a hospital h and a single doctor s block µ if there exists a matching
µ′ with µ →{h,s} µ′ such that both h and s are better off in µ′ as compared
to µ. Similarly, hospitals (h1, h2) and couple c block µ if there exists a
matching µ′ with µ →{(h1,h2),c} µ′ such that (i) c as a couple is better off in
µ′ as compared to µ, and (ii) every hospital in {h1, h2} which is receiving
some new doctor from the couple c in µ′ is better off in µ′ as compared to µ.
Note that, we do not require that both hospitals h1 and h2 must be better
off in µ′. In particular, if a hospital is not receiving any new doctor from the
couple c in the matching µ′, then that hospital has no control over the block,
and hence we do not require it to be better off by the blocking.
Definition 11 A matching µ is stable if it is not blocked by any pair (h, s)
where h ∈ H and s ∈ S, or by any pair ((h1, h2), c) where (h1, h2) ∈ H2 and
c ∈ C.
Note that, members of a couple move according to their couple prefer-
ences, in particular, a member of a couple does not block according to his/her
individual preference.
Remark 2 Note that, by our assumptions on the preferences of hospitals
and doctors, hospitals find all doctors acceptable and doctors find all hospitals
acceptable. Therefore, all matchings are individually rational.
10
2.4 Algorithm
In this section we present a well-known doctor proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm (DPDA) that we will use throughout the paper to match hospitals
with doctors. Our existence proof uses a modification of the Gale-Shapley de-
ferred acceptance algorithm with the doctors making the proposals (DPDA).
We give a very short description of DPDA.
DPDA: In stage 1 of the algorithm, all doctors simultaneously propose to
their most preferred hospitals. Each hospital h provisionally accepts up to
κh most preferred doctors. If a hospital has received more than κh proposals,
then it rejects all the doctors after its κh most preferred doctors. In any step
k, the unmatched doctors propose to their most preferred hospital from the
remaining set of hospitals who have not rejected them in any of the earlier
steps. In any stage of DPDA, since each hospital accepts κh most preferred
doctors, it may reject some doctors that it had provisionally accepted ear-
lier. Hospitals whose provisional list of accepted doctors is less than their
maximum capacity can still add to their accepted list if they have received
fresh proposals. Thus the algorithm finally terminates when each doctor is
matched or has been rejected by all hospitals.
Remark 3 Note that in DPDA, each individual doctor proposes according
to his/her indivdual preference. Thus, couples do not play any role in the
DPDA.
Now we present another well-known algorithm called Serial Dictatorship
Algorithm (SDA). In the SDA, the highest-ranked doctor according to CPI
chooses his/her most-preferred hospital, and in general the k-highest ranked
doctor chooses his/her most preferred hospital among the hospitals with
available vacancy after all the higher ranked doctors have made their choices.
Remark 4 DPDA and SDA produce the same matching under CPI.
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2.5 Conditions for Stability under RVT
In this section, we provide conditions on couples’ preferences satisfying RVT
that guarantee the existence of stable matchings.
Let P 0C = ({P 0d }d∈D\S, {P 0c }c∈C) be a given collection of preferences of the
doctors that are in some couple, and of the couples in C. Let P 0 be an CPI.
Recall that, we assume the indexation of the doctors in couples to be such
that fiP 0mi for all i ≤ k. Then, by D˜(P 0C , P 0) we denote the set of preference
profiles where doctors d ∈ D \S and couples c ∈ C have preferences as in P 0C
and the CPI is P 0, i.e., D˜(P 0C , P 0) = {P˜ : P˜d = P 0d for all d ∈ D \ S, P˜ c =
P 0c for all c ∈ C, and P 0 is the CPI of P˜}.
Condition 1 Suppose (P 0C , P 0) is such that P 0c ∈ DRV Tc for all c ∈ C and
P 0 is the CPI. Then, for each couple c = {f,m} ∈ C and for all h, h′ ∈ H,
(h, h)P 0c (h
′, h) implies hP 0f h′.
Condition 1 says the following. Consider a couple c = {f,m}. Suppose
that a RVT preference of c prefers an allocation where both the doctors of
c are in h to another allocation where f is in h′ and m is in h. Then, it
must be the case that f prefers hospital h over h′ according to its individual
preference. Thus, Condition 1 implies that couples’ preferences are always
responsive with respect to f , i.e., to be together, compromise is always made
by m.
Now we state our Theorem, which says that a stable matching exists at
every preference profile, if an only if the couples’ preferences satisfy Condition
1. Thus, Condition 1 always gives a stable matching for every preference
profile. However, if a couple violates Condition 1, then we can always find a
preference profile with no stable matching.
Theorem 1 Suppose P 0C is such that P 0c ∈ DRV Tc for all c ∈ C. Then, a
stable matching exists at every preference profile in D˜(P 0C , P 0) if and only if
(P 0C , P
0) satisfies Condition 1.
Proof : [Necessity] Suppose P 0C is such that P 0c ∈ DRV Tc for all c ∈ C. Suppose
further that (P 0C , P 0) does not satisfy Condition 1. We show that there is
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a preference profile in D˜ (P 0C , P 0) with no stable matching. Since (P 0C , P 0)
does not satisfy Condition 1, there exists a couple c = {f,m}, two hospitals
h1, h2 ∈ H, such that (h1, h1)P 0c (h2, h1) and h2P 0f h1.
Since h2P 0f h1, it follows from the definition of RVT that (h2, h2)P 0c (h1, h2).
Consider a preference profile P˜ in D˜(P 0C , P 0) such that the CPI P 0 sat-
isfies fP 0d1P 0d2P 0m, and r1(P˜d1) = h1, r1(P˜d2) = h2. Suppose |{d :
dP 0f and r1(P˜d) = h2}| = κh2 − 2, |{d : dP 0f and r1(P˜d) = h1}| = κh1 − 2,
and |{d : dP 0f and r1(P˜d) = h}| = κh for all h 6= h1, h2. Suppose further
that the preferences of all couples other than c satisfy responsiveness. We
show that there is no stable matching at P˜ . Suppose µ is a stable matching
at P˜ . Since µ is stable, it must be that µ(d) = r1(P˜d) for all dP 0f . Moreover,
since |{d : dP 0f and r1(P˜d) = h2}| = κh2 − 2 and |{d : dP 0f and r1(P˜d) =
h1}| = κh1−2, there are exactly 2 positions left in h2 and exactly n positions
left in h1 and h2 after matching all the doctors d such that dP 0f . Now, we
distinguish the following cases for the allocation of the couple c.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2, h2). Then, (h2, d2) blocks µ as r1(P˜d2) = h2 and
d2P
0m.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1, h2). Then, ((h2, h2), c) blocks µ as fP 0d1P 0d2 and
by RVT, (h2, h2)P 0c (h1, h2).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1, h1). Then, (h1, d1) blocks µ as r1(P˜d1) = h1 and
d1P
0m.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2, h1). Then, ((h1, h1), c) blocks µ as fP 0d1P 0d2 and
by RVT, (h1, h1)P 0c (h2, h1).
This completes the proof of the necessity part.
[Sufficiency] The proof of this part is constructive. Suppose P 0C is such that
P 0c ∈ DRV Tc for all c ∈ C. Suppose further that (P 0C , P 0) satisfies Condition
1. Take P˜ ∈ D˜(P 0C , P 0). We construct an algorithm that produces a stable
matching in P˜ . For each couple c = {f,m} and each hospital h, define
13
the conditional preference of m given h, P 0m|h ∈ L(H), in the following way:
h′P 0m|hh
′′ if and only if (h, h′)P 0c (h, h′′). Recall that, by our initial assumption
on CPI, miP 0mj for all i < j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In the following, we present our
algorithm.
Algorithm 1 : Algorithm 1 involves k + 1 steps. We present the 1st step, and
a general step of the algorithm.
Step 1 : Use SDA to match all doctors ranked above m1 according to P 0. Let
f1 is matched to some hospital, say h. Then, match m1 using SDA, where
m1 bids according to P 0m1|h.
...
Step j : Use SDA to match all doctors ranked below mj−1 and above mj
according to P 0. Let fj is matched with some hospital, say h, then match
mj by SDA where mj bids according to P 0mj |h.
...
Continue this process till Step k and then match the remaining doctors by
SDA at step k + 1.
We show that Algorithm 1 produces a stable matching at P˜ . Let µ be
the outcome of Algorithm 1. We distinguish the following cases.
Case 1 : Suppose (h, s) blocks µ through µ′. Note that, by the nature of Al-
gorithm 1, all doctors that propose before s are more preferred to s according
to the CPI. Since s /∈ µ(h), by the nature of Algorithm 1, this means either
dP 0s for all d ∈ µ(h) and |µ(h)| = κh, or µ(s)P˜ sh. If dP 0s for all d ∈ µ(h)
and |µ(h)| = κh, then by responsiveness of hospitals’ preferences, we have
µ(h)P˜hµ′(h). Thus hospital h does not block with s. On the other hand, if
µ(s)P˜ sh, then clearly s does not block with hospital h. This contradicts that
(h, s) blocks µ.
Case 2 : Suppose ((h1, h2), c) blocks µ where c = {f,m}.
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We first show ((µ(f), h2), c) blocks µ. Note that, if µ(f) = h1, then there
is nothing to show.
First, we claim that µ(f)P 0f h1. Assume for contradiction that h1P 0f µ(f).
Note that, by the nature of Algorithm 1, f proposes according to preference
P 0f , and all the doctors that propose before f are preferred to f according
to the CPI P 0. Since f /∈ µ(h1), it must be that dP 0f for all d ∈ µ(h1)
and |µ(h1)| = κh1 . By responsiveness of hospitals’ preferences, this means
µ(h1)P˜h1µ′(h1). This is a contradiction to the fact that ((h1, h2), c) blocks µ
through µ′. Therefore, µ(f)P 0f h1.
Now, we show that (µ(f), h2)P 0c (h1, h2). Suppose h1 6= h2. Since µ(f)P 0f h1,
by RVT it follows that (µ(f),m)P 0c (h1, h2). Now suppose h1 = h2 = h. Since
µ(f)P 0f h1, by Condition 1 we have (µ(f), h2)P 0c (h, h).
Since ((h1, h2), c) blocks µ, (µ(f), h2)P 0c (h1, h2) implies ((µ(f), h2), c) blocks
µ. Now we proceed to show that ((µ(f), h2), c) cannot block µ.
Suppose µ(f) = h for some h ∈ H. Then, by Algorithm 1 and the
definition of P 0m|h, we have h2P
0
m|hµ(m). By the nature of Algorithm 1, all
doctors that propose before m are preferred to m according to the CPI P 0.
Since m /∈ µ(h2), it must be that dP 0m for all d ∈ µ(h2) and |µ(h2)| = κh2 .
By responsiveness of hospitals’ preferences µ(h2)P˜h2µ′(h2). This contradicts
that ((µ(f), h2), c) is a block.
This completes the proof of the sufficiency part. 
2.6 Existence of Stable Matching with Adjacent CPI
In this section, we consider restrictions on the Identical Hospital Preference
and investigate the existence of stable matching under those restrictions.
We relax the RVT condition on the preferences of the couples, by assuming
that a couple can have any preference over the sets of hospitals irrespective
of the preferences of the individual doctors in that couple over individual
hospitals. Such preferences of couples are called unrestricted preferences.
More formally, the set of unrestricted preferences of a couple c ∈ C is L(H¯2).
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However, we still assume that any couple prefers an allocation where each
member of the couple is matched to some hospital over an allocation where
at least one member of the couple is unmatched.
In the following, we define lexicographic preferences of the hospitals. Let
Ph be a preference of a hospital h and D′ ⊆ D. Then, define rk(Ph, D′) = d
if and only if |{d′ ∈ D′ : d′Phd}| = k.
Definition 12 A preference Ph of a hospital h with capacity κh is called
lexicographic if for all D′, D′′ ⊆ D with |D′′| = |D′| ≤ κh, D′PhD′′ if and
only if there exists l ∈ {1, . . . , |D′|} such that rl(Ph, D′)Phrl(Ph, D′′) and
rm(Ph, D
′) = rm(Ph, D′′) for all m < l. The set of lexicographic preferences
of a hospital h is denoted by DLh .
Definition 13 A preference profile P˜ with lexicographic hospitals’ prefer-
ences and RVT couples’ preferences is defined as ({P˜d}d∈D, {P˜ c}c∈C , {P˜h}h∈H)
where P˜d ∈ L(H¯) for all d ∈ D, P˜ c ∈ DRV Tc for all c ∈ C, P˜h ∈ DLh for
all h ∈ H, and hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI. The set of preference pro-
files with lexicographic hospitals’ preferences and RVT couples’ preferences is
denoted by D˜LR.
Definition 14 A preference profile P˜ with lexicographic hospitals’ prefer-
ences and unrestricted couples’ preferences is defined as ({P˜d}d∈D, {P˜ c}c∈C , {P˜h}h∈H)
where P˜d ∈ L(H¯) for all d ∈ D, P˜ c ∈ L(H¯2) for all c ∈ C, P˜h ∈ DLh for all
h ∈ H, and hospitals’ preferences satisfy CPI. The set of all preference pro-
files with lexicographic hospitals’ preferences and unrestricted couples’ pref-
erences is denoted by D˜LU .
In the following, we introduce the notion of Adjacent CPI (ACPI). ACPI
implies that for any couple c = {f,m}, there cannot be a doctor other than
the members of the couple that lies in-between f and m in the CPI. Recall
that, whenever we consider an CPI P 0, we assume for any couple c = {f,m}
that fP 0m. Below, we provide a formal definition of ACPI.
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Definition 15 Let P 0 be an CPI. Then, P 0 satisfies Adjacent CPI (ACPI)
if for any couple c = {f,m} ∈ C there does not exist any d ∈ D \ {f,m},
such that fP 0dP 0m.
Definition 16 Let P 0 be an CPI. Then, the collection of preference profiles
where
• hospitals in H have lexicographic preferences and couples’ preferences
satisfy RVT, denoted by D˜LR(P 0), is defined as D˜LR(P 0) = {P˜ ∈ D˜LR :
P 0 is the CPI of P˜},
• hospitals in H have lexicographic preferences and couples’ preferences
are unrestricted, denoted by D˜LU(P 0), is defined as D˜LU(P 0) = {P˜ ∈D˜LU : P 0 is the CPI of P˜}.
Note that, for any CPI P 0 ∈ L(D), D˜LR(P 0) ⊆ D˜LU(P 0).
Our next theorem says that ACPI is a necessary condition for the ex-
istence of stable matching at every preference profile where hospitals have
lexicographic preferences and couples’ preferences satisfy RVT.
Theorem 2 Let P 0 be an CPI. Suppose a stable matching exists at every
preference profile in D˜LR(P 0). Then, P 0 satisfies ACPI.
Proof : Consider an CPI P 0. Suppose P 0 does not satisfy ACPI. We show
that there exists a preference profile in D˜LR(P 0) with no stable matching.
Since P 0 does not satisfy ACPI, there exists a couple c = {f,m} and doctor
d1 /∈ c such that fP 0d1P 0m. Take two hospitals h1, h2 ∈ H and d2 ∈ D
such that mP 0d2. Consider a preference profile P˜ in D˜LR(P 0) such that
r1(P˜d1) = h1 and h2P˜d1h for all h ∈ H \ {h1}. Further, r1(P˜d2) = h2 and
h1P˜d2h for all h ∈ H \ {h2}. Let the preference of couple c be such that
r1(P˜m) = h1 and h2P˜mh for all h ∈ H \ {h1}. Also, r1(P˜ f ) = h2 and
h1P˜ fh for all h ∈ H \ {h2}. We further assume that (h1, h1)P˜ c(h2, h1) and
(h1, h1)P˜ c(h2, h2). An allocation of the couple c, where at least one doctor in
c is matched to a hospital h /∈ {h1, h2} is assumed to responsive and is ranked
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below all the allocations, where both the members of the couple are either
matched to h1 or h2. Let |{d : r1(P˜d) = h2}| = κh2−2, |{d : r1(P˜d) = h1}| =
κh1−2, and |{d : r1(P˜d) = h}| = κh for all h 6= h1, h2. Finally, we assume that
the preferences of all couples other than c satisfy responsiveness. We show
that there is no stable matching at this preference profile. Let µ be a stable
matching at this preference profile. Since
∑
h∈H κh = |D|, by the preferences
of d1, d2 and c we must have µ(d) ∈ {h1, h2} for all d ∈ {f,m, d1, d2}. Also,
since µ is stable, by the given preferences of the doctors in D, it must be that
µ(d) = r1(P˜d) for all d ∈ D \{f,m, d1, d2}. Now we distinguish the following
cases for the allocation of the couple c.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1, h1). Then, (h1, d1) blocks µ as h1P˜d1h2 and d1P 0m.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2, h1). Then, ((h1, h1), c) blocks µ as fP 0d1P 0d2 and
(h1, h1)P˜ c(h2, h1).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1, h2). Note that since h2P˜ fh1, by RVT (h2, h2))P˜ c(h1, h2).
This, together with the fact that fP 0d1P 0d2, means µ is blocked by
((h2, h2), c).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2, h2). Since (h1, h1)P˜ c(h2, h2), fP 0d1P 0d2 and hos-
pitals’ preferences are lexicographic, µ is blocked by ((h1, h1), c).
This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
Now we prove the converse of Theorem 2 which states that if the hospitals’
preferences satisfy ACPI, then a stable matching exists at every preference
profile where hospitals’ preferences are lexicographic and couples’ preferences
satisfy RVT. However, we prove a stronger version of this, where we show
that if the hospitals’ preferences satisfy ACPI, then stable matching exists
at every preference profile where hospitals’ preferences are lexicographic and
couples’ preferences are unrestricted.
Theorem 3 Let P 0 be an CPI. Suppose P 0 satisfies ACPI. Then, a stable
matching exists at every preference profile in D˜LU(P 0).
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Proof : The proof of Theorem 3 is constructive. Suppose P 0 satisfies ACPI.
We construct an algorithm that produces a stable matching at every pref-
erence profile in D˜LU(P 0). Take P˜ ∈ D˜LU(P 0). Recall that, by our initial
assumption on CPI, miP 0mj for all i < j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Since P 0 satisfies
ACPI, this means fiP 0fj for all i < j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Now, we present our
algorithm.
Algorithm 2 : Algorithm 2 involves k + 1 steps. We present the 1st step, and
a general step of the algorithm. At every step, a couple proposes to a set of
hospitals. Whenever a hospital receives a set of proposals at some step, it
accepts all proposals if it has adequate vacancies, otherwise it rejects all the
proposals.
Step 1 : Use SDA to match all the doctors ranked above f1 according to
P 0. Let c1 = {f1,m1} propose on r1(P˜ c1). If at least one doctor of the
couple is rejected, then let c1 propose to r2(P˜ c1), and so on. Continue this
process till some l such that all the members of the couple c1 are accepted
by corresponding hospital in rl(P˜ c1).
...
Step j : Use SDA to match all the doctors that ranked below cj−1 = {fj+1,mj+1}
and above cj = {fj,mj} according to P 0. Let cj propose on r1(P˜ cj). If at
least one doctor of the couple is rejected, then let cj propose to r2(P˜ cj), and
so on. Continue this process till some l such that all the members of the
couple cj are accepted by corresponding hospital in rl(P˜ cj).
...
Continue this process till Step k and then match the remaining doctors by
SDA at the step k + 1.
We show that Algorithm 2 produces a stable matching at P˜ . Let µ be
the outcome of Algorithm 2. We distinguish the following cases.
Case 1 : Suppose (h, s) blocks µ through µ′. Note that, by the nature of
Algorithm 2, all the doctors that propose before s are preferred to s according
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to the ACPI P 0. Moreover, for any c = {f,m} ∈ C, if fP 0s, then by ACPI,
mP 0s. Since s /∈ µ(h), by the nature of Algorithm 2, we have either dP 0s
for all d ∈ µ(h) and |µ(h)| = κh, or µ(s)P˜ sh. If dP 0s for all d ∈ µ(h)
and |µ(h)| = κh, then by responsiveness of hospitals’ preferences, we have
µ(h)P˜hµ′(h). Therefore hospital h does not block with s. On the other hand,
if µ(s)P˜ sh, then s does not block with hospital h. This contradicts that (h, s)
blocks µ.
Case 2 : Suppose ((h1, h2), c) blocks µ through µ′ where c = {f,m}. Then,
it must be that (h1, h2)P˜ c(µ(f), µ(m)). By the nature of Algorithm 2, this
means couple c proposes to (h1, h2) before proposing to (µ(f), µ(m)), and
some hospital, say hi ∈ {h1, h2}, rejects at least one member of the couple c.
We look at the following cases
Case 2.1 : Suppose h1 6= h2. Since hi rejects a doctor from couple c, it must
be that hi has no vacancies when c proposes to (h1, h2). This means that if
((h1, h2), c) blocks µ through µ′ then µ(hi)P˜hiµ′(hi). This together with the
fact that µ′(hi) 6⊆ µ(hi), is a contradiction to the definition of a block.
Case 2.2 : Suppose h1 = h2. Because h1 rejects at least one member of c, it
must be that h1 has less than 2 vacancies when c proposes to (h1, h1). Let
D′ be the set of doctors that are present in h1 at the time when c makes
a proposal to (h1, h1). By ACPI and the nature Algorithm 2, this means
each doctor in D′ is preferred to both the doctors of the couple c. Again, by
the nature of Algorithm 2, it follows that D′ ⊆ µ(h1). This means h1 must
release some doctors from D′ for the block ((h1, h1), c) to block µ through µ′.
Since dP˜h1fP˜h1m and P˜h1 is lexicographic, we have µ(h1)P˜h1µ′(h1). This
together with the fact that µ′(h1) 6⊆ µ(h1), is a contradiction to the definition
of a block. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.

In what follows, we show by means of an example that the lexicographic
assumption on the hospitals’ preferences is necessary for Theorem 3. In
other words, we show that if hospitals’ preferences are not lexicographic, then
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existence of a stable matching is not guaranteed even if hospitals’ preferences
follow ACPI. In fact, we show a stronger version where the existence of
a stable matching is not guaranteed under the additional assumption that
couples’ preferences satisfy RVT.
Example 1 Consider a matching problem where H = {h1, h2} with κh1 =
κh2 = 2, D = {f,m, s1, s2} and there is exactly one couple c = {f,m}
in C. The preferences of individual doctors, preference of the couple and
ACPI of hospitals on the set of individual doctors is given in Table 1. The
couple’s preferences over pairs where one member is matched with a hospi-
tal h ∈ H and the other one is unmatched is not shown in the table, but
assumed to be responsive and ranked below the shown pairs. Finally, we as-
sume, {f,m}Ph1{s1, s2}. Note that, the preference of the hospital h1 is not
lexicographic. Further note that, the preference of the couple c satisfies RVT.
P 0 Ps1 Ps2 Pf Pm Pc
s1 h1 h2 h1 h2 (h1, h1)
f h2 h1 h2 h1 (h2, h2)
m (h1, h2)
s2 (h2, h1)
Table 1: Preferences
Clearly, for a stable matching µ, each hospital should get exactly 2 doctors.
We consider all 4 possible cases of couple matching.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1, h1). Since s1P 0m and h1Ps1h2, µ is blocked by
(h1, s1).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2, h2). Since {f,m}Ph1{s1, s2} and (h1, h1)Pc(h2, h2),
µ is blocked by ((h1, h1), c).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1, h2) or (h2, h1). We show µ is blocked when µ(c) =
(h1, h2), the proof of the same for µ(c) = (h2, h1) can be obtained
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by changing the roles of f and m. Suppose µ(c) = (h1, h2). Since
h1Ps1h2 and s1P 0s2, if µ(h1) = s2, then µ is blocked by (h1, s1). Now
suppose µ(s1) = h1. Since µ(f) = h1, this means µ(s2) = h2. Then,
(h2, h2)Pc(h1, h2) and fP 0s2 imply µ is blocked by ((h2, h2), c).
This shows that there is no stable matching for the given matching problem.
2.7 Matching Market with Non-Identical Hospital Pref-
erences and Couples
In this section, we investigate what happens if the CPI condition is slightly
relaxed. However, we assume that for all couples c = {f,m} ∈ C and for all
hospitals h ∈ H, fPhm.
In what follows, we show by the means of an example that the CPI
assumption on hospitals’ preferences is necessary for Theorem 1. In other
words, we show that if hospitals’ preferences do not satisfy CPI, then the
existence of a stable matching is not guaranteed even if couples’ preferences
satisfy Condition 1.
Example 2 Consider a matching problem where H = {h1, h2, h3} with
κh1 = κh2 = κh3 = 2, D = {f,m, s1, s2, s3, s4}, and there is exactly one
couple c = {f,m} in C. The preferences of individual doctors, preference
of the couple, and preferences of hospitals on the set of individual doctors
is given in Table 2. The couple’s preference over pairs where one member
is matched with a hospital and the other one is unmatched is not shown in
the table, but assumed to be responsive and ranked below the shown pairs.
Note that, the preference of the couple c satisfies Condition 1.
Let µ be a stable matching at the preference profile given in Table 2.
Since µ is a stable matching and r1(Ph1) = s3 and r1(Ps3) = h1, it must
be that µ(s3) = h1. Similarly, r1(Ph2) = s4 and r1(Ps4) = h2, it must be
that µ(s4) = h2. Thus we can just consider a reduced Matching problem,
where κh1 = κh2 = 1 and κh3 = 2 and s1, s2, f,m are the only doctors to be
matched.
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Ph1 Ph2 Ph3 Ps1 Ps2 Ps3 Ps4 Pf Pm Pc
s3 s4 s3 h2 h3 h1 h2 h1 h2 (h1, h2)
s4 s3 s4 h1 h1 h2 h1 h3 h1 (h1, h1)
s1 f f h3 h2 h3 h3 h2 h3 (h1, h3)
f m m (h3, h3)
m s1 s1 (h3, h2)
s2 s2 s2 (h3, h1)
(h2, h2)
(h2, h1)
(h2, h3)
Table 2: Preferences
Finally,since µ is stable and s1Phs2 for all h ∈ H, it must be that either
µ(s1) = µ(s2) or µ(s1)Ps1µ(s2). Now we look at different cases for possible
allocations of the couple. Note that since it can not be the case that µ(c) =
(h1, h1) or µ(c) = (h2, h2), we do not consider these two cases.
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1, h2). Since h1Ps1h3 and s1Ph1f , µ is blocked by
(h1, s1).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h1, h3). Since (h1, h2)Pc(h1, h3) and mPh2s1, µ is
blocked by (h2,m).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h3, h3). Since (h1, h2)Pc(h3, h3), mPh2s1, and fPh1s2,
µ is blocked by ((h1, h2), c).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h3, h2). Since (h3, h3)Pc(h3, h2) and mPh3s2, µ is
blocked by (h3,m).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h3, h1). Since (h3, h3)Pc(h3, h1) and mPh3s2, µ is
blocked by (h3,m).
• Suppose µ(c) = (h2, h1). Since h1Ps1h3 and s1Ph1m, µ is blocked by
(h1, s1).
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• Suppose µ(c) = (h2, h3). Since (h3, h3)Pc(h2, h3) and fPh3s2, µ is
blocked by (h3, f).
Thus, there is no stable matching at this preference profile.
In view of the above example, we look for a condition on couples’ pref-
erences that is sufficient to ensure the existence of a stable matching when
hospitals’ preferences do not follow CPI. Recall that, we have a condition on
hospitals’ preferences that f is preferred to m for all the hospitals h.
Let P 0C = ({P 0d }d∈D\S, {P 0c }c∈C) be a given collection of preferences of the
doctors that are in some couple, and of the couples in C. Then, by D˜(P 0C)
we denote the set of preference profiles where doctors d ∈ D \ S and couples
in c ∈ C have preferences as in P 0C , i.e., D˜(P 0C) = {P˜ : P˜d = P 0d for all d ∈
D \ S and P˜ c = P 0c for all c ∈ C}.
Condition 2 Suppose P 0C is such that P 0c ∈ DRV Tc for all c ∈ C. Then,
there exists a responsive preference Pc ∈ DRc for all c ∈ C such that for
all c = {f,m} ∈ C and all (h1, h2), (h3, h4) ∈ (H¯ × H¯) \ (hf , hf ) where
r1(P
0
f ) = hf , we have (h1, h2)Pc(h3, h4) if and only if (h1, h2)P 0c (h3, h4).
Condition 2 implies that for a couple c = {f,m}, P 0c satisfies responsive-
ness over all pairs of hospitals except (hf , hf ) where r1(P 0f ) = hf . Further-
more, P 0c violates responsiveness for togetherness only when both members
of the couple get a position at hf . In other words, couples’ preferences always
satisfy responsiveness with respect to f , and m is ready to violate respon-
siveness only if f gets its highest preferred hospital.
In the following theorem, we show that existence of a stable matching is
guaranteed at a preference profile if the couples’ preferences satisfy Condition
2.
Theorem 4 Suppose P 0C is such that P 0c ∈ DRV Tc for all c ∈ C. Then,
a stable matching exists at every preference profile in D˜(P 0C) if P 0C satisfies
Condition 2.
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Proof : The proof of Theorem 4 is constructive. Suppose P 0C is such that
P 0c ∈ DRV Tc for all c ∈ C. Suppose further that P 0C satisfies Condition
2. Take P˜ ∈ D˜(P 0C). We construct an algorithm that produces a stable
matching in P˜ . For each c = {f,m} ∈ C there exists some Pc ∈ DRc such
that for all (h1, h2), (h3, h4) ∈ (H¯× H¯)\ (hf , hf ) where r1(P 0f ) = hf , we have
(h1, h2)Pc(h3, h4) if and only if (h1, h2)P 0c (h3, h4). For each couple c = {f,m}
and each h ∈ H, define a conditional preference of f given h, P 0m|h ∈ L(H),
in the following way: h′P 0m|hh
′′ if and only if (h, h′)P 0c (h, h′′). In the following
lemma, we establish a connection between P 0m and P 0m|hf .
Lemma 1 Suppose c = {f,m} is a couple and h1, h2, hf are all distinct hos-
pitals. Then, h1P 0mh2 implies h1P 0m|hfh2.
Proof : Assume for contradiction that h1P 0mh2 and h2P 0m|hfh1. Since h2P
0
m|hfh1,
we have (hf , h2)P 0c (hf , h1). As h1, h2, hf are all distinct, by Condition 2 we
have (hf , h2)Pc(hf , h1). Because Pc ∈ DRc , this means h2P 0mh1, which is a
contradiction. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Now we present our algorithm that produces a stable matching at P˜ .
Algorithm 3 : Use DPDA where every doctor bids as a single doctor. For all
c = {f,m}, f proposes according to P 0f and m proposes according to P 0m|hf
where r1(P 0f ) = hf . Also, for all s ∈ S, s proposes according to P˜ s.
The following lemma establishes an important property of DPDA. The
proof of the lemma is elementary, however we present it for the sake of
completeness. Let µ be the outcome of Algorithm 3.
Lemma 2 Suppose a doctor d is rejected by hospital h at some stage of Al-
gorithm 3 . Then (h, d) can not block µ through µ′.
Proof : Since h has rejected d during some stage of Algorithm 3, it must be
that hospital h had κh many proposals from doctors that are better than d
according to P˜h at the time when h rejected d. Therefore, by the nature of
DPDA, all the doctors that are matched with h at the end of Algorithm 3
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must be better than d according to P˜h. So, h will not block with d. This
completes the proof of the lemma. 
Now, we show that Algorithm 3 produces a stable matching at P˜ . We
distinguish the following cases.
Case 1 : Suppose (h, s) blocks µ through µ′. Since s blocks with h, we have
hP˜ sµ(s). Therefore, it must be that s proposed to h and was rejected by h
earlier in Algorithm 3. Hence, by Lemma 2, (h, s) cannot block µ.
Case 2 : Suppose ((h1, h2), c) blocks µ through µ′ where c = {f,m}. Here,
h1 and h2 are not necessarily different. Since c blocks with (h1, h2), we have
(h1, h2)P
0
c (µ(f), µ(m)).
Case 2.1 : Suppose µ(f) = hf . By the definition of P 0c , this means (hf , h2)P 0c (h1, h2).
Since (h1, h2)P 0c (hf , µ(m)), this implies (hf , h2)P 0c (hf , µ(m)). Because ((h1, h2), c)
blocks µ through µ′ and µ(f) = hf , it follows that ((hf , h2), c) also blocks
µ. Note that, (hf , h2)P 0c (hf , µ(m)) implies h2P 0m|hfµ(m). Therefore, by the
definition of Algorithm 3, it must be that m proposed to h2 and got rejected
at an earlier stage of Algorithm 3. Hence, by Lemma 2, ((hf , h2), c) cannot
block µ.
Case 2.2 : Suppose µ(f) 6= hf . Since f bids according to P 0f , using similar
logic as before, it follows that either h1 = µ(f) or µ(f)P 0f h1. This, together
with the facts that (h1, h2)P 0c (µ(f), µ(m)) and µ(f) 6= hf , implies h2P 0mµ(m).
Because µ(f) 6= hf , it must be that |µ(hf )| = κhf and dP˜hff for all d ∈ µ(hf ).
Since fP˜hm for all h ∈ H, this means dP˜hfm for all d ∈ µ(hf ). Therefore,
µ(m) 6= hf . Moreover, since ((h1, h2), c) blocks µ through µ′, it follows that
h2 6= hf . Because h2P 0mµ(m), it must be that h2 6= µ(m). As µ(m), h2, hf are
all distinct and h2P 0mµ(m), by Lemma 1 we have h2P 0m|hfµ(m). Therefore,
by the definition of Algorithm 3, it must be that m proposed to h2 and got
rejected at an earlier stage of Algorithm 3. Hence, by Lemma 2, ((h1, h2), c)
cannot block µ.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4. 
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3 Conclusion
We considered many-to-one matching problems between doctors and hospi-
tals, where doctors consisted of some couples. We saw that under common
preference of hospitals over individual doctors, stable matchings exist only
when the lesser preferred member is ready to violate responsiveness to be
together with the more preferred member. However, in the final section, we
saw that a stable matching may not exist when hospitals do not have common
preferences over singleton doctors. Thus, under arbitrary hospitals’ prefer-
ences, it becomes harder to obtain stable matching when couples’ preferences
violate responsiveness.
We also saw that even when the hospitals have common preference over
individuals, it is only possible for couples to have arbitrary violation of re-
sponsiveness only if the members of the couple are ordered consecutively and
the hospitals’ preferences are lexicographic. Thus, we need more restrictions
on hospitals preferences to obtain stable matchings when couples’ preferences
are arbitrary
However, under common preference over individuals, it might still be
possible to obtain a stable matching by further weakening RVT. It might
be an interesting problem to characterize the preferences of couples which
always guarantee a stable matching hospitals’ preferences are common over
individual doctors.
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